July 12th, 2009 at 02:53pm
Under Banking Law
DEMOCRACTIC DEFICIT IN AN INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK: THE QUEST TO BALANCE THE SCALES
By
Leonard Nkole Kalinde*
Central banking is of cardinal importance in any country because of the legal right normally granted to central banks to create money. This money can serve as a means of payment, a unit of account and a store of value. One of the important issues immediately arising after granting this right to a central bank, is whether this function should fall under the ultimate control of the executive branch of government – the cabinet and its administrative departments – or whether parliament should leave this responsibility to be freely executed by an independent, autonomous powerful institution run by unelected people.
The traditional argument in favour of a strong, independent central bank is that the power to spend money should in some way be separated from the power to create money. Numerous episodes in the world’s economic history testify to a government’s potential abuse of its power to create money. However, one potential objection to a completely independent central bank is lack of democratic accountability and transparency. This paper discusses the challenges of ensuring central bank accountability and transparency in an environment where the central Bank is independent. Part two discusses the concept of central bank independence. Part three examines and analyses the need to have democratic accountability and transparency in the operations of a central bank. Part four concludes that proper democratic accountability and transparency in central operations is not a counterweight to the principle of central bank independence.
Nowadays it is widely believed that a high level of central bank independence coupled with some explicit mandate for the bank to restrain inflation are important institutional devices to assure price stability. It is thought that an independent central bank can give full priority to low levels of inflation, whereas in countries with a more dependent central bank other considerations, notably, re-election perspectives of politicians and a low level of unemployment, may interfere with the objective of price stability. Indeed, there is considerable evidence for a negative relationship between central bank independence and inflation. The extent and nature of central bank independence can be assessed on the basis of its legal provisions However, central bank independence also hinges on a broad series of factors and customary practices, which are partly determined by historical developments in the different countries. In particular, the way in which certain conflicts with other bodies of government have been resolved influences the extent to which a central bank is effectively protected against external interferences and marks the boundaries of independence.
Central Bank independence refers to three areas in which the influence of government must be excluded or drastically curtailed, that is to say, independence in personnel matters, financial autonomy and policy independence. These are now discussed hereunder:
2.1. Personnel Independence
The nomination and dismissal of the Governor and members of the central bank’s decision-making bodies pertain to the political authorities. In practice, it is not feasible to exclude government influence completely when appointments are made to such an important public institution as central banks. Personnel independence thus refers to the influence that government has in appointment procedures. Various criteria are relevant here, like governmental representation in the governing body of the central bank, appointment procedures, terms of office and procedures governing dismissal of the board of the bank.
The legal framework for central banking in Zambia, which is the Bank of Zambia Act No. 43 of 1996, in Section 10, vests the power of appointing the Governor in the President of the Republic of Zambia. However, this is subject to ratification by the National Assembly. Furthermore, Section 13(1)(b) vests the power of appointing Members of the Bank of Zambia Board of Directors in the Minister of Finance and National Planning. Finally, Sections 10(7) and (14(2) gives the power to disappoint the appointment of the Governor and Members of the Board of Directors to their respective appointing authorities. Their tenure of office is specified in sections 10(1) and 14(1), which gives the Governor five years and Directors three years, respectively.
Financial Independence
A central bank cannot operate credibly in an independent way without proper financial means. It is clear that politicians can influence central bank policy if the government is able to finance its expenditure either directly and or indirectly via central bank credits. In that case there is no financial independence. The concept of financial independence should, thus, be assessed from the perspective of whether any third party is able to exercise either direct or indirect influence not only over the central bank tasks but also its ability to fulfil its mandate. In this regard, four aspects of financial independence – the right to determine its own budget; the application of central bank-specific accounting rules; clear provisions on the distribution of profits; and clearly defined financial liability for supervisory authorities – are particularly relevant in this respect.
The Bank of Zambia Act has several provisions that regulate how the Bank is to conduct its financial affairs and what the government responsibility is towards its financial well-being. In the first instance, Section 6(3) makes it clear that the Government is the sole subscriber to the paid-up capital of the Bank and its holdings of the paid-up capital is not transferrable in whole or in part nor can it be subject to any encumbrance whatsoever. According to Section 6(5), whenever the Bank of Zambia Board certifies that the assets of the Bank are less than the sum of its capital and other liabilities, the Minister is required to cause to be transferred to the ownership of the Bank negotiable and interest bearing securities issued by the Government for such amount as is necessary for the purposes of preserving the capital of the Bank from any impairment. In addition, Section 7 has elaborate provisions on how the net profits of the Bank are to be determined for each financial year, and where the Bank makes a loss on its profit and loss statement, as certified by the auditors, the Minister is again required to cause to be transferred to the ownership of the Bank, cash or negotiable instruments bearing market interest rates and such securities shall be delivered to the Bank within sixty (60) days from the date of certification of the accounts by the auditors.
2.3. Policy Independence
Policy independence is related to the room for manoeuvre given to the central bank in the formulation and execution of monetary policy. It may be useful to distinguish between goal independence and instrument independence. A central bank has goal independence if it can decide on the formulation of its ultimate objective(s). In practice, most central bank laws formulate one or more objectives. For instance, Section 4 of the Bank of Zambia Act provide that the functions of the Bank shall be to formulate and implement monetary and supervisory policies that will ensure the maintenance of price and financial system stability so as to promote balanced macroeconomic development. However, if the central bank has been trusted with various (possibly conflicting) goals – such as achieving low inflation and low unemployment – it has considerable scope in deciding on its priorities. In that case, the central bank has considerable goal independence since it is relatively free to set the final goals of monetary policy. It could, for instance, decide that price stability is less important than output stability, and act accordingly. Finally a central bank must wield effective instruments in order to defend its objective(s). A bank that has instrument independence is free to choose the means by which it seeks to achieve its goals. Clearly, if government approval is required for the central bank’s use of policy instruments, no instrument independence exits. Perhaps, the most disconcerting provision of the Bank of Zambia Act is Section 5, which provides that the Minister may convey to the Governor such general or particular Government policies as may affect the conduct of the affairs of the Bank and the Bank shall implement or give effect to such policies. This provision could lead to serious interference with the operations of the Bank.
At a glance, the concept of central bank independence seems to be in conflict with the democratic principle that government policies should be controlled by elected officials rather than by an elite group that is insulated from the political process. Although there are plenty of other areas of national life where decision-making is delegated to independent unelected officials, the judiciary being a prime example, there is a fundamental confusion here between being independent and lacking accountability and transparency. It is often argued that central bank independence and democratic accountability are contradictory. This is, however, only correct as far as decisions about the ultimate goal of and final responsibility for monetary policy are concerned. In other words, a central bank should not be goal independent but must be granted instrument independence.
The corollary of this view is that the institutional commitment to macroeconomic stability should come from the government in the form of an explicit, legislated mandate for the central bank to pursue, for instance, price stability as its overriding long-run goal. Indeed, as Issing argues, the more clearly and precisely this mandate is defined, the easier it will also be in a democracy to monitor the performance of the central bank. Moreover, in order to maintain credibility, an independent central bank must not only be open and clear about the reasons for its actions but it must also be accountable to democratic institutions.
3.1. Central Bank Accountability
In any evaluation of the democratic accountability of the central bank, the relationship between the central bank itself and the legislature has to play a major role. No central bank can be totally independent, in the sense that it is not answerable to anyone. Even the most independent central bank has to report in some form or another to the legislature, which in any case also has the ultimate power to change the laws governing the central bank. In this regard, it has been argued that the legislature holds the ultimate responsibility for monetary policy since it can change the legal basis of the central bank. The mere threat of a change of the law may induce even independent central banks to ensure that monetary policy will in general be in accordance with the wishes of elected politicians. However, there is a difference between a situation where policy decisions are under continuous scrutiny and an arrangement where the central bank reports to the legislature periodically.
In the Zambian context, Section 9 (1) of the Bank of Zambia Act requires the Bank, in consultation with the Minister, to publish in the Government Gazette, every six (6) months interval, a policy statement that shall contain: (a) a description and an explanation of the reasons for the monetary policies to be followed by the Bank during the following six (6) months; (b) a description of the principles that the Bank proposes to follow in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy during the next two years or such other period of time as the Minister may decide; and (c) a review and assessment of implementation, by the Bank, of monetary policy during the period to which the last proceeding six months policy statement relates. The Minister is required, within the first sitting of the National Assembly next after the receipt of the monetary policy report, to lay it before the House.
In addition, Section 27 requires the Board of the Bank of Zambia to, as soon as is practicable but not later than six months after the expiry of each financial year, submit to the Minister a report concerning its activities during such financial year. The Minister may also request the Board to submit to him such other reports, returns or statements, duly certified by an auditor, as he may consider necessary. Furthermore, the Bank of Zambia is also required, under Section 28(1), to cause to be published in the Government Gazette a return of its assets and liabilities, and to deliver to the Minister a return of its monthly assets and liabilities whenever he so requires.
It is important to note that the issue of independence and accountability also turns on the nature of the relationship between the government and the legislature as the political authorities on the one hand and the central bank on the other. Without encroaching on the independence of the central bank, there should be a legal requirement for the central bank to report to the legislature and/or explain policy actions in the legislature. The legislature should have the opportunity to review the performance of the central bank with regard to monetary policy on a regular basis, while the central bank at the same time can explain and justify its conduct. In the European case, the Treaty establishing the European Community imposes precise reporting obligations on the European Central Bank. The European Central Bank must deliver an annual report on the activities of the European System of Central Banks to the European Parliament, the European Council and the European Commission. The European Parliament can also summon the President of the European Central Bank and the other members of the Executive Board to appear before it and make the necessary presentations.
Furthermore, a central bank may not only be directly accountable to the legislature but also to the government, which is, in turn, accountable to the legislature. In that case, it is important that the government is able to influence the central bank’s behaviour. Without such influence, accountability would not go beyond mere reporting by government to parliament of central bank policies, for which government cannot be held responsible. Finally, the dismissal procedure for a central banker can amount to a mechanism of ex post accountability if a central banker official can be dismissed on the grounds of bad performance, that is to say, not realising stated objectives. Dismissal may function as a sanction for poor performance by linking the tenure of central bank officials to policy results, that is to say, meeting the predetermined monetary policy target. This is the case for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand where the policy target agreement between the Governor of the Bank and the Minister of Finance lays down the policy targets, which the former has to achieve. Inadequate performance can result in the dismissal of the Governor.
3.2. Central Bank Transparency
Another very important element of central bank accountability is central bank transparency. In this regard, central bank transparency cannot be logically separated from accountability. This is because whatever other arrangements concerning democratic accountability may exist, their scope is limited without transparency because information concerning the behaviour of the central bank is crucial for the evaluation its performance. Where the reasoning behind, and strength of opinion supporting, certain monetary policy decisions are transparent, it is easier to make a judgement and to hold central bank officials accountable for their behaviour. Indeed, as Buiter argues, the entire monetary policy process must be transparent for democratic accountability. Therefore, a central bank should be required to report at regular intervals on its current and future plans for monetary policy in accordance with the monetary objective. This is even more important where a clear monetary objective is missing because in such cases the central bank can only be judged on the basis of its own statements.
As transparency should not be left to the discretion of the central bank, the law should prescribe certain procedures for explaining monetary policy. There are various possibilities, ranging from reports, minutes and other communication devices. Transparency will certainly be improved if the monetary authorities have to explain the extent to which they were able to reach the final objectives of monetary policy. In the European case, Article 15.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and European Central Bank requires the European Central Bank to publish reports on the activities of the European System of Central Banks at least once every quarter. However, in its attempts to enhance transparency, the European Central Bank has committed itself to go beyond the reporting requirements specified in the Treaty. The President explains the reasons behind the Governing Council’s decisions in a press conference and details of the Governing Council’s views are published in the ECB Monthly Bulletin.
4.0. CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that at a glance, the concept of central bank independence seems to be in conflict with the democratic principle that government policies should be controlled by elected officials rather than by an elite group that is insulated from the political process. The basic principle of democracy, which expects the public to be able to exercise control over government actions, strongly suggests that elected politicians should decide on the explicit definition and ranking of the objectives of monetary policy. Central bankers should never forget that they are ultimately accountable for their policies to the elected politicians and to the public at large (including future generations). In this respect, it is misleading to think of proper accountability and transparency as a ‘counter-weight’ to central bank independence. On the contrary, accountability is the ‘other side of the coin’ of independence and the two concepts are mutually reinforcing rather than antagonists, as is sometimes suggested. Any weakening of the democratic control over an independent institution may lead to excessive discretion and unclear objectives, which risks creating political backlashes against independence and may overtime undermine independence itself. Therefore, independence is sustainable in the long term only if accompanied by strong accountability and transparency in the operations of the independent institution. The legal provisions can more easily be circumvented if there are no provisions ensuring central bank transparency and accountability.
July 12th, 2009 at 08:54am
Under Banking Law
Restructuring: concept, goal and contest. Termini restructuring is of Latin origin and means changing-improvement of the structure of some object or system, i.e. its forms and consistence (morphology). It basically means unchanged character of directions of its functioning. They use restructuring from large plan in the economical texts mostly with debts, including foreign ones, payments and taxation (trade) balance, corporation sector of the economy and of separate enterprises, of banking system entirely and separate banks (other credit organizations).
They define “restructuring” in legislation in the following way: restructuring of credit organization is a complex of activities directed towards eradication of financial fluctuations of the organization and recovering its pay abilities or towards realization of liquidity of this organization. This definition doesn’t make needed opinion about the occasion to be discussed, as, in the first place, here they mean only separate credit organizations and not banking system itself, and, second, it has very technical character and mixes the essence and contest of the process of restructuring with the activities, which may (or must) be realized in this process.
Thus, there is not common, widely excepted definition of restructuring, though majority agrees with the idea, that we must consider restructuring to be readjustment of (cure) of banking system and its taking out of the crisis phase, also its returning to the conditions of good labor abilities. They sometimes use termini of “stabilization of banking system”, but we consider it to be comfortable. The fact is, that achieving stability may be provided in various ways, including the one of liquidating whole system. There is another point of view, that they consider restructuring to be the process for overcoming difficulties, appeared during the crisis. This point of view is not quite fluent.
Thinking of the essence of the affair and not its definition, hen we must consider in reconstruction of banking system as a process – totality of decisions and actions. Its basic elements are:
Foreseeing these elements, we can state following definition: restructuring banking system in managed process of its global readjustment (improvement), supported by changing in industrial, cash, taxation, budgetary and information policy, also in the policy of the banks themselves, and which is directed towards formation of banking system adequate to effective, trustful and dynamically developed modern requests.
According to this definition, restructuring effective, stabile and healthy banking system in not needed (though, it is possible to improve or reform it). Thus, restructuring is a cure (curing something that is not healthy), i.e. restructuring may be understood and must be understood to be the process, with the help of which banking system of concrete country transit to the new level of development. It is also evident, that restructuring is curing of such systems, which are in crises and can not get out of it without help. Finally, from the point of restructuring (privately displaying necessity of financial curing) we must discuss absolutely every bank. In this case, restructuring, as a process of readjustment, seems to have its own instrumentation, which will not be bounded only with the instruments of ordinal procedure banking management?
According to the mentioned above, we can make main goal of restructuring process of banking system – its recovery and taking its movement to the relatively new trajectory, at which it already gains earlier lost potential of progressive development and becomes adequate to the real sector of the economy again.
 while processing activities of reforming banking system they must clearly define a circle of those problems, which must be solved during the process of reforming with the help of renewed banking system and they must set the price of activities;
effective restructuring requests combined methods of approaches towards the problems. World practice processed principles and methods of approaches of solving banking crisis, approbation of which showed their sufficient effectiveness. It is nonprofessional and not expedient to use some principles and refusing others;
a process of solving crisis may not be fast, simple or cheap.
Th8is common goal, mentioned above, in its turn, may be concreted into the list of those problems, working at which must form real concept of restructuring process according to the conditions in modern Georgia:
There is an idea about the fact, that main goal of restructuring banking system is recapitalization of the banks (recovering lost a capital and its further growth), but it is not quite correct: since today the hardest problem is, that a spectra of profitableness and trustfulness of capital investment is very tight.
Some bankers offer such understanding of restructuring and such pragmatic activities of radical reforming of banking system, the essence of which finally has been brought to the regrouping of the almost bankrupted banks according to the principles of specialization (specialized banks working in the country scale, banks oriented towards export or those obligated in the groups of large enterprises, also regional banks). they meant, that new “system forming” groups would obey to the strict control of appropriate governmental structures or groups of enterprises, in exchange of it, it will have right for working on budgetary resources. Suggestions of separate bankers were not related with the problems of recovering whole banking system.
We can form basic problems of restructuring banking system in the following way:
Transiting to the foundation of a healthy market banking system by readjustment of separate problematic banks, providing structural reform of banking system;
Increasing whole capital of banks and filling banking system with long-termed resources;
Creation conditions stimulating growth of the quality of market commercial banks, including those in the regions.
Main goal of restructuring program must be: creating such layer of technological market commercial banks, which provides marketing policy and makes basic profit from credit-operations. It is interesting, that within the bound of 2-3 years program share of such capital in the banking system may reach up to 30-40%, and credit share in the credit portfolio of banking system – 30%. Share of profit made from crediting in whole income of banking system must not be less, than 6%. Half of such healthy banks must still function in the regions.
The concept of those first steps, which must make foundation to the realization of effective program of restructuring banking system, must be formed in this way:
 Restructuring: principles and conditions. We can name following to be the obligatory principles (main rules) of the process restructuring banking system:
A principle of solidary obligations. The essence of it is, that in the mentioned process there participate (with out resources) and coordinate the banks themselves (in the first place – the owners), their creditors and the government. It is impossible to restructure banking system without state support. Though, it is evident, that the state will not be able to support every bank, having extremely reduced resources. Accordingly, the banks in the first place must try to solve their problems independently and the managers and creditors of the cured banks must stand on the advantage position.
The principle of minimizing loss and expenses. It says, that while realizing restructuring we must consider those activities, which give the opportunities of overcoming crisis with the less budgetary expenses (financial expenses of the society) and with little loss from the side of banking system and the clients of banks to be more prior.
Liquidation of problematic banks is much losable, but socially more difficult way. It needs especially measured method of approach towards the problems of the depositors the banks to be liquidated. Fast liquidation of not solvent banks may deepen the crisis (an Indonesian example in 1997-1998). According to the estimation of numbers of experts, best way out of it is confluence of the problematic bank with the healthy one, though this is quite doubtful recommendation.
A principle of minimizing liquidation requests to give priorities to the activities of reorganization and support and not bankrupting in the process of restructuring and financial curing.
A principle of just distribution of expenses on restructuring mean, that the stated part of expenses on curing banks must be compensated by those, who receive risks related with these banks, are responsible for their loss and make profit after restructuring (i.e. participants of the banks, its highest administration). Economical obligation of not solvent managers and owners of the banks may be expressed, for example, by adequate reduction of their own banking capital, their participation in the restructuring process in the way of additional entering in the bank capitals. Part of the loss may be covered at the expense of the depositors.
A principle of strategic method of approach means definition of the strategic problem, what kind of banking system is wanted by the society after restructuring (in the condition if it conforms to the new purposes and functions of the banks at the new stage). Only after this they must select advantage and agreed activities, which may be recommended for readjustment of separate banks and its entire system.
A principle of complex method of approach means, that a system defined by the program must be fulfilled completely. It is impossible to bring whole concept of reconstruction process to its separate consisting parts (for example, everything mustn’t be bounded only with solving financial problems displayed in one concrete period of time).
We can name such principles of providing restructuring, as transparency (necessity) of distributing expenses related with it, strengthening management of those banks, which are supported by the state, encouraging independent adaptation of the banks with the changed situation and others.
Following conditions of restructuring are also of great importance:
According to the mentioned above, we can separate some leading questions about restructuring banking system, on which there still is no satisfying answers.
Foreign experience of restructuring banking system. Bank reconstruction is not a unique problem. Banking crisis has been noticed almost in 70 countries during 20 years. A process of recovering balance has been continuing very difficultly everywhere and the state participated in them (though, scales of this participation were different in the different places and periods. Sometimes reasons of the crisis coincided with each other, sometimes they were specific. But forms of their solving coincided in many cases: stabilizing crediting, filling own capital of the banks, purchasing their assets (including passed debts) and others. As a rule, basic financial heaviness leaned upon the state directly, or in the way of financing specially founded agencies by it.
USA was a pioneer in the field of banking restructuring, where a system of guaranteed deposits and a special institute managing these deposits has been founded under the influence of the crisis in 1929-1933. This institution was a federal corporation insuring deposits (FCID).Next stage of restructuring banking sphere is related with the series of banking crisis took place in absolutely different countries during last 20 years.
In 1980-1991 1300 banks and 1400 borrowing-saving associations stopped existence in the USA. According to the different estimations, restructuring banking system cost 300-500 billion dollars (5% of the WIP). In 1995 banking crisis took place in Japan, in 1994-1995 – in France, in 1989-1990 – in Australia, in 1987-1989 – in Norway, in 1991 – in Sweden, in 1991-1993 – in Finland, in 1980-1982, 1900-1991 and 1995 – in Argentina, in 1990, 1994-1995 – in Brazil, in 1981-1982, 1990-1991 and 1995 – in Argentina and Mexico, in 1982-1984 – in Chile, in 1994-1995 – in India, in 1994 – in Indonesia, in 1985-1988 – in Malaysia, in 1981-1987 – in Philippines, in 1991-1995 – in Hungary, in 1990s – in Poland, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and others. In some countries systemic crisis used to be repeated periodically. Some countries were able to avoid systemic basic crisis with the help of having insurance system, in the first place, at the expense of effective banking management and regulation.
Price of restructuring banking system is very different: 5% of WIP in the USA, 10 – in Hungary and Brazil, more, then 40 – in Chile and 55% – in Argentina.Central banks can support problematic banks in the crisis situation, especially in case of spoiling their current liquidity. In Venezuela, eight not solvent banks used special lines of liquidity for compensating money resources. Though, they were not able to cover borrowed sources in the future.
In other cases, crediting is an important step of central banks. They are supported during banking crisis and give them resources and terms for restructuring credit organizations. A long termed support provided by the central bank of Poland is a good example of it, when it purchased low profitable shares and long-termed bonds from the banks. Granting long-termed credits by the central bank sometimes depends on creation of complex plans of improving situation by the banks (list of stated activities and expected results).
Reducing the level of obligatory reserves (or increasing percentage payments on them) is another way of supporting banks, for example, part of obligatory reserves of deposits poste restates were set free for financing purchasing certificates of termed deposits of the institutions, which had been working by the program of restructuring banks.
They use special tax advantages very seldom in the process of bank restructuring. Notwithstanding this, Brazil used tax stimuli for encouraging confluence: “swallowed” bank could exclude then value of not active credits, “the sallower” received credits equaled to the distinction between the purchase and balance prices. Some countries use tax stimuli for shares and bonds issued during the realization of restructuring program.
They somehow make the rules of regulation and management under the conditions of restructuring banking system simple. They compensate this by creation such middle-termed system of regulation and management (in the crisis period), which foresees risks of banking activities more adequately.
To save the banks being in hard position actions provided by the state may support weakening the feeling of responsibility of the banks. In such conditions, the following is of great importance not to give rise to the weakening encouragement of irresponsible behavior of the banks in the future. It is considered, that it is necessary to grant a sum for making large profit and participants of the banks must be responsible for their obligations. They requested from the banks to discard a capital partially a conditions for making support in South Korea; the state obliged itself with bad debts of credit organizations in Mexico only in case if its participants used to make additional income; while bankrupting of credit organizations in Brazil and India, their participants were obliged to enter additional sum equal to the size of their initial entering in the nominal fund.
Herewith, participant of the banks are not always obliged with the responsibilities, for example, in case of the loss received from those credits, which are granted by banks by the state indications, it is necessary to range the size of responsibility, as the participants may not have possibility for solving problems in the credit organization because of the not having transparency and of the organization calculations and other reasons.
They founded specialized institutions in the most part of the countries during restructuring banking system, which have been obliged with the problems of managing this process.
A government and central banks of many countries solved problems with bank crisis and restructured own banking system in different ways. Practice has shown up, that there is neither ideal form of restructuring, nor the universal strategy of normalizing situation in banking sector. Very often this or that action depends on concrete occasion. Notwithstanding this, we may separate total signs of successful programs, which have been realized abroad:
the fastest definition of the scales of problems, its recognition on the state level and readiness of the government for granting important financial resources for solving problems;
passing transparent, activities adequate to the essence of the problem, moving âbadâ assets from the problematic banks off;
processing complex, transparent, operative program, its correct and successive development;
fulfillment of the procedures of banking management.
Chile. A complex of activities. Large scaled restructuring of banking system in Chile has started since 1984, when a central bank of the country started granting stabilizing credits for supporting liquidity of the banks and purchasing their not trustful credits or changing not active assets on liquidity. Deregistration of the bank debts took place in the way of turning creditors into the shareholders.
State became a guarantor for foreign debts of the private banks. Size of the debts transited to the central bank of Chile by the end of 1985 overcame whole capital of problematic banks 3 times and consisted 6 billion dollars (25% of WIP). About 60% of expiated credits were changed on its bonds by the central bank.
They involved straight state control in numbers of system forming banks of the country.
Recapitalization of the banks transited under the state control used to be realized in the way of additional issuing of the shares placed among small and middle investors. A state corporation of supporting development (CORFO) worked on this program.
Results. The banks practically fulfilled their obligations in the part of the deposits of physical and juridical persons with the help of the used activities. Though the quantity of national private banks was reduced from 22 to 15, but they were able to keep every large bank and improve their working by 1987. After 1996 every commercial bank of Chile has been considered to be competitionable.
The value. By the end of 80s, expenses provided on restructuring banking system of Chile consisted from 30 to 40% of the country WIP.
Mexico. A complex of activities. Restructuring of banking system in Mexico has been started in 1995 after devaluation of national currency and strengthening of financial situation, which followed devaluation. One of the nominal activities of Mexican bank (main bank of the country) was involving special calculation unit UDI (unidades de inversion), which was indexed with the level of prices. Whole assets of the banks were calculated by it, for avoiding devaluations of credit portfolios of the banks.
Basic organ working on restructuring banks was banking fund of protecting savings (FOBAPROA). During the process of readjustment it expiated securities from the bank and banks provided deposing of received resources in the Mexican bank. They gave five years to the banks for expiating these papers. In other cases they were going to convert them into the shares of these banks and their realization at the market.
For solving problems with foreign debts of national banks central bank granted short-termed currency credits from these banks to them, who passed payment of these obligations. At the same time FOBADROA published doubtful assets of commercial banks. Herewith, the shareholders, in its turn, were obliged to enter sums equal to the half of resources granted by FOBAPROA. Banks were to enter resources received from this operation into the 10 year bonds.
They involved outer management of problematic banks. In some cases they granted their shares to the foreign banks. At the same time they supported bank debtors, provided restructuring of their liabilities.
Results. With the help of restructuring Mexico could avoid destroying of banking system. Deposits of the people practically were not defected. They kept trust of foreign investors in the banks of the country.
The value. Restructuring of banking system of Mexico costs 60-65 billion dollars (about 14.5% of national WIP).
Argentina. A complex of activities. State governmental organs in Argentina supported more trustful banks for solving problems of banking crisis. They used differenced method of approach. They separated banks into several groups:
I group â Middle and large banks having temporal problems of liquidity because of loosing clients. They granted them credits of central bank of Mexico and Banco de la nacio Argentina;
II group â small banks, which were to confluence with large, relatively healthier banks or were to be swallowed by them;
III group â small banks, which were at the edge of bankrupting. They stopped operations in these banks and they desired to readjust, sell and liquidate them;
IV group â 12-15 state banks owned by the administration of Argentinean provinces, which were to be privatized.
Expiation of âbadâ debts was provided not by state agencies, but file largest commercial banks, which founded a special trust-fund in January 1995 together with the central bank. For compensating provided expenses they reduced a normative of reserved requests.
Results. A complex of anti-crisis activities in Argentina provided stabilization of banking system in one year. Though during this period position of foreign banks were significantly strengthened. There share in the total assets of banking system of the country drew up 42%.
The value. Expenses wasted on restructuring banking system of Argentina drew up 2.5-3.5% of the country WIP according to the various estimations.
Scandinavian countries. A complex of activities. notwithstanding distinctions in the reasons provoking crisis in every Scandinavian country, a conception of restructuring banking system leaned upon practically united conditions and principles of state support. They are:
Programs of restructuring banking systems of these countries were being realized by optimal conformity of responsibilities and stimuli at every level including owners, organs of managing separate banks and regulating organs of whole system.
A value. Expenses in Sweden consisted 4.3% of WIP and 9.9% – in Finland.
Hungary. A complex of activities. Restructuring banking system has been continuing in two stages. At the first stage (1992-1995) the state used to transfer important sum of money in problematic and, in the first place, large banks. At the same time clearing of bank assets in the way of changing âbadâ credits at state bond took place. They used state guarantees very actively. They tried to use special structure for centralized restructuring â capital investment and development bank of Hungary, but by 1995 the banks appeared again under the critical situation.
At the second stage (1995-1997) method of approach in relation with restructuring has been changed. They used state resources only for supporting those large state banks, which were to be privatized. Restructuring made them attractive for western investors.
Results. State share in the bank capital after first stage has been increased from 41.4% in 1991 till 69% in 1994. The result of second stage was increasing the share of foreign capital in the banking system of the country till 60% by 1997 (in 1996 â 48%, in 199535%, in 1991-1994 â 12-15%) and reduction of the share of state property till 20.66%. Share of âbadâ debts in total sum of debts by 1993-1997 has been reduced from 13.2 till 1.2%. There was no occasion of selling deposits or refusing returning money to the debtors.
A value. Expenses provided at restructuring banking system of Hungary consisted from 12 till 18% of its WIP.
Estimating restructuring in Russia. Necessity of restructuring Russian banking system has become evident in the middle of the 90s. They began appropriate practical activities from August in 1998, which at the beginning had an operative anti crisis character. Herewith, they paid special attention in the first variant of restructuring program to the saving of many-profiled (âsystem formingâ), interregional banks, but later they decided to gather middle and small banks.
Operative anti-crisis activities. In 1998-1999 bank of Russia (central bank) together with the government of the country provided operative activities for recovering ability of the bank, to be able to realize basic complex of service.
1.They provided three many-sided interbank clearing, which made it possible to register 30 billion rubles for recovering taxation system. In many regions this gave opportunity to the banks to release from the cargo of nonpayment wholly or partially.
2.They decided to move obligation of numbers of banks towards physical persons to the savings bank of Russia.
3.they used a mechanism of refinancing banks from September 1998 for supporting bank liquidity: they granted Lombard credits to the more, then 80 banks, overnight â to 34, one year credits to 15 on them; they changed normative of obligatory reserves (total 5% normative). They gave banks right of regulating obligatory reserves.
4.Changes took place in the requests towards banks. Central bank postponed usage of activities influencing in case of not consisting minimal normative of own capital of the banks for two years.
5.They involved special norms regulating activities of the selected circle of banks, in which there were: rule of calculating absolute sizes of economical normative, changing of calculating rules of some normative, rule of influencing activities. this gave the banks damaged by the crisis, though having good perspectives opportunity for leaning upon the quantity of their capital owned by the banks till the first of August 1998, or changing currency course of Ruble while taking risks.
6.They reduced limit of open currency positions, strengthened rule of calculating liquidity normative.
7.They reduced 10 times registration of payment and size of the price for opening branch.
8.They changed prohibition for paying entering in the nominal capital by foreign currency.
9.They involved requests towards registration of currency risks formed by balance-free operations and termed agreements. They managed activities of credit organizations working on the consolidated basis. They involved a rule of foreseeing bank risks in the banks.
10. They continued foreseeing licensing of those banks, which abolished law, had not satisfying financial situation, and had no perspectives of development.
At the same time, Bank of Russia and a government processed long-termed activities for solving basic problems of restructuring banking system. We can separate following:
Participating in processing those legislative acts, which are necessary for success of restructuring banking system;
Working of executive government with the local organs for the purpose of defining their possible participation in normalizing banking activities in the regions;
Participation in foundation of the Agency of restructuring banking system (ARBS) and collaboration of central bank with it in the fields of restructuring separate banks;
Creation regime of prior support for restructuring banks.
For the purpose of widening possibilities of postponing own capital by the banks:
They abolished prohibition on paying entering in the nominal capital of the banks and receiving subordination loans by the foreign capital;
They processed a rule of making entering in the nominal capital of the banks, when it takes place at the expense of converting bank obligations in the licenses of participating in the nominal capital;
They changed methods of approach towards requests of minimal size of own capital. These requests are still active for newly founded banks and are abolished for the active ones;
The involved the rule of paying nominal capital of the banks by the state securities.
By the end of 1999 Russian bank announced finishing of the first stage of restructuring banking system, which means, that this system recovered ability of providing basic complex of service, they kept viable kernel of the banks.
According to the Russian bank data, quantity of problematic banks by the first of January 2000 has been reduced from 480 till 199, and by the first of November â till 155. They widened the scales of bank activities, increased their assets. Whole capital of the active banks (except saving banks) has been increased per 2.7, though its size consisted only 46% towards the August of 1998, they reduced the number of those banks, normative of liquidity of which was less, then the obligatory level H3 per 70%.
The affair has been being interrupted by the absence of an evident economical policy of the government. The bank of Russia had no conception of recovering and developing banks, which would be received by the totality of banks and finally state role and the place of central bank, instruments to be used in relation with commercial banks, main goals and directions of working with restructuring. At the way of restructuring lack of resources still remained to be the main problem.
Bank of Russia and ARBS estimated possibilities of forming quite effective instrument, which would give them possibility for organizing, managing and transformation of banking system, also,, their possibilities and readiness in the wealth of the resources of bank refinancing and self-curing.
It is more dangerous, that bank of Russia considers liquidation of the banks to be prior way of working with problematic banks.
Herewith, liquidation of the banks loosing license is processing very slowly and is followed by large expense. To the mind of Bank Association of Russia (BAR), restructuring process is continuing slowly and not progressively. They consider, that bank of Russia has been able to define banks to be supported, discuss the programs of their curing and supporting realization of these programs. They have had enough time for avoiding not viable banks, but they havenât done that. 40% of credit organizations of banking system have lost their licenses, and only 3/5 of them have been rubbed out of the registration book. Middle term of liquidation procedures is 2-3 years. Herewith, almost half of competition mass is worked for organizing competition management and current expenses. Creditors of the banks in such occasion loose their money forever. It seems that n case of liquidating bank only those of the interested persons win, who provides the procedure of liquidation and bankrupting.
Finally, it must be mentioned, that bank of Russia practically refused providing credit support to the banks for the purpose of providing stabilizing activities. The state refused to support practical programs of restructuring banking system as well. After these, the society suffers more and more loss.
They often call a process of transforming banking system in Russia âslowly progressive restructuringâ. Truly, in fact it is brought to the individual and spontaneous âconformityâ of the banks to the new request of the time. This makes it dangerous, that this will recover only earlier banking system â with the same weaknesses and defects.
Experience of overcoming banking crisis in the USA. US economy has been influenced by banking problems several times. One of them appeared during the period of large depression of 1929-1933. Thousand of bank deposits were devaluated because of ineffective operations of the banks, also not returning of the granted loans and total degradation of the economy. They closed hundreds of banks and provided confiscation of thousands of objects because of not returning of loans. US congress passed laws about founding federal corporations insuring deposits and also those insuring loans and savings. Except insuring, these corporations were obliged to research a lot of financial institutions for the purpose of finding defects in bank legislation and procedures and regulation of banking operations. This system has been working effectively during many years.
By the end of 1970 and beginning of 1980 banking industry of the USA was fluctuated by another financial catastrophe. To the analytical mind, reason of this was defective practice of granting doubtful credits, also, not transparency of the activities of regulating organs. Such organs that time were department of currency control, corporations mentioned above and institutions of Federal Reserve System. Exactly this time they destroyed reductions on percentage rates set for the banks on the attracted resources. They gave the banks right to pay any percents to the depositors (but higher, then market rates). Thatâs why rates in the 80s overcame annual 20%. It is evident, that the banks were to grant credits in higher percents (25% and more) for keeping profitableness.
Prices were being grown, especially those of immovable property (mostly because of expensive inner prices on oil). They abolished reductions to the borrower-saving associations on realization financing venture projects related with immovable property and speculative commercial operations (at whole US territory). Then they let the commercial banks grant credits on reconstruction projects and other risky operations related with immovable property (the government stimulated such operations), as in the country, so abroad. Herewith, for guaranteeing such credits, banks attracted deposits with very high percents. By the end of the 80s it was impossible to return such credits because of high percents and side spread of speculative character of the borrowersâ operations. Scales of bankrupting companies and private persons in those years were extreme. Finally, values of oil and immovable property have been significantly cheapened. Because of low level of banking management and under the conditions of deregulation reduced the number of hundreds of borrow-saving associations and financing resources of commercial banks, that they started using deposits attracted by the higher rates for payments on the old deposits and, they continued granting risky credits. By the end of 1988 both mentioned corporations were nearly bankrupted, as they were to give all their resources to the not solvent banks and associations in the way of insurance payment. The US congress was to provide banking reform again.
Under such conditions the congress passed the law about reforming, recovering obligations of financial institutions and compulsory payment (FIRREA). This law signed in 1989 became the most fluent banking law, had ever being passed in the USA. For its realization and according to it they founded Trust Corporation of returning resources (RTC), which has following goals:
The congress didnât pass those parts of the legislative act, which foresaw financial support of the shareholders of problematic credit organizations and thus didnât help massive restructuring of such organizations. Thus, Credit Corporation started playing functions of liquidations department and not those of restructuring agency.
Restructuring separate banks of the USA was realized only in exceptional occasions and even if the share-holders were ready to enter additional important resources into the capital and the creditors agreed to find compromised solution of obligations related with discounting. Herewith, they were to like restructuring plan. During whole history, they provided restructuring only of several banks in the USA.
During the six year of existence, Trust Company managed and liquidated 747 not solvent borrow-saving corporations (40% of such organizations). A corporation, usually, was able to find firm and easily managed bank, which would oblige itself with obligations existed at the deposits of the bankrupted organizations. According to the FIRREA law, corporation used to give such banks cash or liquid assets of same volume. When transition of deposits didnât take place in such banks, the corporation according to the corporation normative paid the depositor guaranteed part of their deposits (not more, then 100Â 000 dollars). Middle rest on the depository account in the bankrupted organizations consisted 7500 dollars, total quantity of their depositors overcame 25 million people. Total balance value of the shares of these organizations was 451 billion dollars. By the end of the activities of RTC, in December in 1995, 95% of these assets were sold per price equal to the 87% of balance value, or the corporations was able to return 87 cents on every dollar.
RTC processed and involved special methods of marketing and realization of bank assets, most of which have been used widely in other countries, they are:
RTC administration knew, that mission of this corporation would be hard to be fulfilled, without having correctly planned strategy, strictly processed methodology and procedures, also without strict control. The most difficult problem was conforming conditions of selling assets, covering loans and restructuring, also stating responsibilities and limits of wasting RTV resources.
They found way out by setting limits and wide distributing obligations. The procedures of transiting obligations to the staff workers foresaw preparing statement on every asset.
As a rule, main reason of banking problems is bad management. Inability of the setting good inner control and strict keeping of the procedures finally brought the bank to the strengthening problems and bankrupting. Unprofessional management may give rise to the mistakes in managing risks and liquidity. When these questions are guaranteed by the managers and administration of the banks, this is followed by problematic assets and problematic banks. Exactly this took place in the USA in 1970-80s. There were too many banks and they granted huge credits, and this was absolutely incorrect. Weak organization of selecting borrowers by the banks, entering of payments and controlling financial position of the borrowers and also weak management showed up. Â
Lamara Qoqiauri
Date and place of birth: October 6, 1948
Working place: Tbilisi Iv. Javakhishvili State University
Tel.: (+99532) 79-07-10; (+99532) 760595
Web-site:
www.nino.skola.dlf.ge
e-mail:
qoqiauri@yahoo.com
Address: Tbilisi, Varketili, 159, Gakhokidze St.
Working experience
A republican department of Georgian State Bank (National Bank) ———from 1970 1976
Tbilisi, 3/5, Kirov (now Leonize) St. – Accountant economist, An inspector of providing accountant-loan operations, cash fulfillment of budget.
A republican department of “MshenBank ————————————— from 1976 – 1977
As a Chief economist
Tbilisi Iv. Javakhishvili State university —————————————— from 1977 – till now
As a Laboratory assistant of a cathedra, Research worker, Associate professor, Professor.
Gori Economical Institute (now State university)
English private school-college “Nino”- Owner
Education/training
Tbilisi, Komarov high school of physics and mathematics
Tbilisi, technical school-college of finances and economy
Tbilisi, Iv. Javakhishvili State University, Faculty of economy (evening department)
Post-graduate course of Georgian scientific academy of economy and logistics
Tbilisi State University, Economical faculty
Nongovernmental association of private schools
Qualification
Scientific status – Professor
Doctor of economical science
Doctor of economical science, professor.
Accountant-economist of Bank
Candidate of economical sciences, associate professor
Published works
Quantity of works -108
Monographs between them â 14
Manuals between them -5
Quantity of works during last 10 years â 84
Quantity of works in the referred magazines- 43